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CRYPTANALYSIS OF ANSHEL-ANSHEL-GOLDFELD-LEMIEUX KEY AGREEMENT
PROTOCOL
ALEX D. MYASNIKOV AND ALEXANDER USHAKOV
Abstract. The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld-Lemieux (abbreviated AAGL) key agreement protocol [2] is pro-
posed to be used on low-cost platforms which constraint the use of computational resources. The core of
the protocol is the concept of an Algebraic EraserTM (abbreviated AE) which is claimed to be a suitable
primitive for use within lightweight cryptography. The AE primitive is based on a new and ingenious idea
of using an action of a semidirect product on a (semi)group to obscure involved algebraic structures. The
underlying motivation for AAGL protocol is the need to secure networks which deploy Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) tags used for identification, authentication, tracing and point-of-sale applications.
In this paper we revisit the computational problem on which AE relies and heuristically analyze its
hardness. We show that for proposed parameter values it is impossible to instantiate the secure protocol.
To be more precise, in 100% of randomly generated instances of the protocol we were able to find a secret
conjugator z generated by TTP algorithm (part of AAGL protocol).
1. The Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol
A general mathematical framework of AAGL protocol is quite complicated. In this paper we try to omit
unnecessary details and simplify the notation of [2] as much as possible. We refer an interested reader to [2,
Sections 2 and 3] for a complete description. Here we start out by giving a particular implementation of the
primitive called the Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP).
1.1. A platform group. Fix an integer n ≥ 7 and a prime p. Let t = (t1, . . . , tn) be a tuple of formal
variables. Define matrices
x1(t) =


−t1 1
1
. . .
1


and for i = 2, . . . , n− 1
xi(t) =


1
. . .
ti −ti 1
. . .
1


which is the identity matrix except for the ith row where it has successive entries ti, −ti, 1 with −ti on
the diagonal. We look at the matrices x1(t), . . . , xn−1(t) as elements of the group GL(n,Fp(t)) of n × n
matrices with entries as Laurent polynomials over the finite field Fp. The symmetric group on n symbols Sn
acts on GL(n,Fp(t)) by permuting the variables t1, . . . tn. We denote the result of the action of s ∈ Sn on
x ∈ GL(n,Fp(t)) by sx.
The semidirect product GL(n,Fp(t))⋊Sn of the groups GL(n,Fp(t)) and Sn relative to the defined action
of Sn on matrices GL(n,Fp(t)) is a set of pairs
{(m, s) | m ∈ GL(n,Fp(t)), s ∈ Sn}
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with multiplication given by
(m1, s1) · (m2, s2) := (m1 ·
s1 m2, s1 · s2).
Denote by si = (i, i+ 1) ∈ Sn the transposition which interchanges i and i+ 1 and by gi the element of the
semidirect product GL(n,Fp(t))⋊ Sn
gi = (xi(t), si).
A subgroup
G = 〈g1, . . . , gn−1〉
of GL(n,Fp(t)) ⋊ Sn is called the colored Burau group. The group G is a platform group for AAGL key
agrement protocol.
Recall that the group Bn of n-strand braids has the classical Artin’s presentation:
Bn =
〈
σ1, . . . , σn−1
∣∣∣∣ σiσjσi = σjσiσj if |i− j| = 1σiσj = σjσi if |i− j| > 1
〉
.
A word over the group alphabet {σ1, . . . , σn−1} is called a braid word. Any n-strand braid can be represented
by a braid word. The length of a shortest braid word representing an element g ∈ Bn is called the geodesic
length of g relative to the Artin’s set of generators and is denoted by |g|. The function | · | : Bn → N is called
the geodesic length function on Bn.
Lemma 1.1. The elements gi = (xi(t), si), for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, satisfy the braid relations and hence
determine a representation of the braid group Bn, i.e., the mapping σi
ϕ
7→ gi defines a group epimorphism
ϕ : Bn → G.
Proof. Straightforward check. 
1.2. Action of the platform group on GL(n,Fp). Fix elements τ1, . . . , τn ∈ Fp and define a homo-
morphism π which maps GL(n,Fp(t)) into GL(n,Fp) by assigning the value τi to the variable ti, i.e., by
evaluating a matrix at τ1, . . . , τn. We call π the evaluation function.
Assumption on τ1, . . . , τn. We assume that π defines a correct group homomorphism.
Relative to the chosen tuple τ1, . . . , τn ∈ Fp and the corresponding function π one can define an action of
GL(n,Fp(t))⋊ Sn on GL(n,Fp)× Sn by putting
(m1, s1) ⋆ (m2, s2) = (m1 · π(
s1m2), s1s2)
where ⋆ denotes the action. Indeed, it is not difficult to check that ⋆ is an action and satisfies the property
((m1, s1) ⋆ (m2, s2)) ⋆ (m3, s3) = (m1, s1) ⋆ ((m2, s2) · (m3, s3)).
We say that (m1, t1) and (m2, t2) ⋆-commute if the equality
(π(m1), s1) ⋆ (m2, s2) = (π(m2), s2) ⋆ (m1, s1)
holds. The next lemma is obvious.
Lemma 1.2. Let w =
∏m
k=1(xik (t), sik) and v =
∏l
p=1(xjp(t), sjp) be such that |ik − jp| > 1 for every
k = 1, . . . ,m and p = 1, . . . , l. Then the elements w and v ⋆-commute.
1.3. The protocol. Before the parties perform actual transmissions the following data is being prepared
by the Third Trusted Party (TTP).
• A matrix m0 ∈ GL(n,Fp) which has an irreducible characteristic polynomial over Fp. The choice of
m0 is not relevant for the purposes of this paper, we refer the reader to [2] for more information on
how m0 can be generated randomly.
• ⋆-commuting subgroups A = 〈w1, . . . , wγ〉 and B = 〈u1, . . . , uγ〉 of the group G. We want to point
out that the elements wi and vj are given to us as products of generators of G and there inverses,
i.e., as formal words in group alphabet {g1, . . . , gn−1}. We prefer this form because it allows us to
avoid time consuming matrix multiplication in GL(n,Fp(t)).
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Both, the matrix m0 and subgroups A and B, can be chosen only once. Now, the public and private keys
are chosen as follows:
Alice’s Private Key: is a pair which consists of a matrix of the form
na = l1m
α1
0 + l2m
α2
0 + . . .+ lrm
αr
0 ∈ GL(n,Fp)
(where l1, . . . , lr ∈ Fp and r, α1, . . . , αr ∈ Z
+) and a random sequence wε1i1 , . . . , w
εm
im
of generators of A and
their inverses.
Alice’s Public Key: is an element
Apublic = (na, id) ⋆ w
ε1
i1
⋆ . . . ⋆ wεmim ∈ GL(n,Fp)× Sn.
Recall that each wik is given as a formal product of the generators of G. To perform the ⋆-operation efficiently
one should not directly compute wik , but consequently apply the factors of wik to the argument.
Bob’s Private Key: is a pair which consists of a matrix of the form
nb = l
′
1m
β1
0 + l
′
2m
β2
0 + . . .+ l
′
r′m
βr′
0 ∈ GL(n,Fp)
(where l′1, . . . , l
′
r′ ∈ Fp and r
′, β1, . . . , βr′ ∈ Z+) and a random sequence v
δ1
j1
, . . . , vδljl of generators of B and
their inverses.
Bob’s Public Key: is a pair
Bpublic = (nb, id) ⋆ v
δi
j1
⋆ . . . ⋆ vδljl ∈ GL(n,Fp)× Sn.
Again, each vjk is given as a formal product of the generators of G. To perform the ⋆-operation efficiently
one should not directly compute vjk , but consequently apply the factors of vjk to the argument.
The shared key: is an element of GL(n,Fp)× Sn obtained by Alice in the form
[(na, id) ·Bpublic] ⋆ w
ε1
i1
⋆ . . . ⋆ wεmim
and by Bob in the form
[(nb, id) ·Apublic] ⋆ v
δi
j1
⋆ . . . ⋆ vδljl
It requires a little work to prove that the obtained elements are indeed equal in GL(n,Fp). We omit the
proof.
1.4. TTP algorithm. The cornerstone part of the proposed key-exchange is the choice of ⋆-commuting
subgroups of the group G. The basic idea is to use Lemma 1.1 and choose commuting subgroups A and B
in Bn and then pull them into G using the epimorphism ϕ. The resulting subgroups ϕ(A) and ϕ(B) of G
commute. Moreover, for any choice of π the subgroups ϕ(A) and ϕ(B) ⋆-commute.
Before we present the algorithm we need to give some details about the braid group Bn. The group Bn
has a cyclic center generated by an element ∆2 where ∆ is an element called the half twist and can be
expressed in the generators of Bn as follows:
∆ = (σ1 . . . σn−1) · (σ1 . . . σn−2) · . . . · (σ1).
Any element g ∈ Bn can be uniquely represented in a form
∆pξ1 . . . ξp
satisfying certain conditions and called the left Garside normal form.
Now, since ∆2 is a central element it follows that element u,w commute in Bn if and only u∆
2p and
w∆2r do (for any choice of p, r ∈ Z). Hence, we may always assume that the normal forms of the generators
{w1, . . . , wγ} and {v1, . . . , vγ} have the power of ∆ equal to 0 or −1. When we say that we reduce a braid
modulo ∆2 we mean changing the ∆-power of its normal form to −1 or 0 depending on parity.
The algorithm below (originally proposed in [2]) generates two ⋆-commuting subgroups.
Algorithm 1.3. (TTP algorithm)
(1) Choose two secret subsets BL = {bl1 , . . . , blα}, BR = {br1 , . . . , brβ} of the set of generators of Bn,
where |li − rj | ≥ 2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ lα and 1 ≤ j ≤ rβ .
(2) Choose a secret element z ∈ Bn.
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(3) Choose words {w1, . . . , wγ} of bounded length over the generators BL.
(4) Choose words {v1, . . . , vγ} of bounded length over the generators BR.
(5) For each i = 1, . . . , γ:
(a) calculate the left normal form of zwiz
−1 and reduce the result modulo ∆2;
(b) put w′i to be a braid word corresponding to the element calculated in (a);
(c) calculate the left normal form of zviz
−1 and reduce the result modulo ∆2;
(d) put v′i to be a braid word corresponding to the element calculated in (c).
(6) Publish the sets {v′1, . . . , v
′
γ} and {w
′
1, . . . , w
′
γ}.
We want to point out that TTP algorithm produces generators of two commuting subgroups in Bn. Alice
and Bob need to compute their images in GL(n,Fp(t)) to obtain ⋆-commuting subgroups.
1.5. Security assumptions. It was noticed in [2] that if the conjugator z generated randomly by TTP
algorithm is known then there exists an efficient linear attack on the scheme which is able to recover the
shared key of the parties. The problem of recovering the exact z seems like a very difficult mathematical
problem because it reduces to solving the system of equations
(1)


w′1 = ∆
2p1zw1z
−1
. . .
w′γ = ∆
2pγ zwγz
−1
v′1 = ∆
2r1zv1z
−1
. . .
v′γ = ∆
2rγzvγz
−1
which has too many unknowns, only left hand sides (i.e., elements w′1, . . . , w
′
γ , v
′
1, . . . , v
′
γ) are known. Hence,
it might be difficult to find the original z.
Now observe that the AAGL key exchange protocol uses only the output of TTP algorithm, namely the
tuples {v′1, . . . , v
′
γ} and {w
′
1, . . . , w
′
γ} since all internal values in TTP algorithm are not available to the
parties. In other words it is irrelevant for the protocol how two particular commuting generating sets were
constructed. This observation leads us to the following problem
For tuples {v′1, . . . , v
′
γ} and {w
′
1, . . . , w
′
γ} find any z
′ and any numbers p1, . . . , pγ , r1, . . . , rγ ∈
Z such that the words {∆2p1z′−1v′1z
′, . . . ,∆2pγz′−1v′γz
′} and {∆2r1z′−1w′1z
′, . . . ,∆2rγz′−1w′γz
′}
can be expressed as words over two disjoint commuting subsets of generators of Bn.
This is a new problem for computational group theory. Let us refer to it as simultaneous conjugacy separation
search problem (abbreviated SCSSP). We want to emphasize that SCSSP has little in common with the
simultaneous conjugacy search problem often referenced in the papers on the braid group cryptanalysis. The
main difference is that in the conjugacy search problem both conjugate elements are available and the goal
is to recover the secret conjugator. And in case of SCSSP only the left side of the equation is known. It is
not clear if one of the problems can be reduced to the other.
It follows from the observation above that any solution z′ to a problem stated above plays a role of a
conjugator z and can be used in a linear attack outlined in [2]. The main goal of this paper is to present
an algorithm which for proposed parameter values solves SCSSP. Experimental results convince us that our
attack is a serious threat for AAGL as the success rate is 100%. Furthermore, a slight modification of the
algorithm produces the exact z generated by TTP in 40% of randomly generated instances.
1.6. Proposed parameter values. To provide 80 bits of security against the exhaustive search for z for
the scheme the authors propose two slightly different sets of parameters:
• Parameter set # 1.
– Let n = 14, p = 13, and r = 3.
– Choose the conjugator z randomly of length 17.
– Choose the words wi and vj randomly of length approximately 10.
– The number γ of the words wi and vj is 27.
• Parameter set # 2.
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– Let n = 12, p = 13, and r = 3.
– Choose the conjugator z randomly of length 18.
– Choose the words wi and vj randomly of length approximately 10.
– The number γ of the words wi and vj is 27.
2. TTP attack
In this section we describe a heuristic attack which finds a solution to a given instance of SCSSP. The
main ingredient in our attack is a length function on the group Bn. As it is explained in [6] there are no
known efficiently computable and ”sharp” length functions for braid groups. Therefore, for our attack we
adopt the method of approximation of the geodesic length function originally proposed in [5]. In all our
algorithms by | · | we denote approximation of the geodesic length function.
We present results of experiments which show that a fast heuristic procedure based on the length-based
reduction is extremely successful for the suggested parameters. In fact, every instance of TTP algorithm
generated in our experiments has been broken.
2.1. Generation. The original paper [2] lacks any details on how to randomly generate the secret element
z and the words {w1, . . . , wγ}, {v1, . . . , vγ} in TTP algorithm. Hence, in all our experiments:
• The word z is taken uniformly randomly as a word of a particular length from the ambient free group
F (σ1, . . . , σn−1).
• The words w1, . . . , wγ and v1, . . . , vγ are taken uniformly randomly as words of particular lengths
from the ambient free groups F (BL) and F (BR).
Also, the authors suggest to take the sets BL and BR randomly on step (1) of TTP algorithm. Observe
that in general this might result in a choice of BL such that for some 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ n− 1
σi, σk ∈ BL, but σj ∈ BR.
We think that this situation is not desirable as it excludes the use of at least two braid generators in the
words wi and vj . We think that the choice of the following sets
BL = {σ1, . . . , σl} and BR = {σl+2, . . . , σn−1}
(where n is an even number and l = (n− 2)/2) is optimal as it excludes only σl+1 which maximizes the size
of a space for the words w1, . . . , wγ and v1, . . . , vγ .
2.2. Recovering ∆-powers. The first stage in our attack is recovering ∆ powers in the system (1), i.e.,
computing numbers p1, . . . , pγ and r1, . . . , rγ . The main tool in our computations below is the triangular
inequality for the Cayley graph of the braid group Bn. Observe that the following inequalities hold.
(Parameter set #1) For each i = 1, . . . , γ
|z−1uiz| ≤ 2|z|+ |ui| = 44 and |z
−1wjz| ≤ 2|z|+ |wj | = 44
and
|∆2p| = pn(n− 1) = 182p.
Hence, |∆2pz−1uiz|, |∆2pz−1wjz| ∈ [182p− 44, 182p+ 44] and
|∆2pz−1uiz| − |∆
2(p−1)z−1uiz| ≥ 182− 2 · 44 = 94
|∆2pz−1wjz| − |∆
2(p−1)z−1wjz| ≥ 182− 2 · 44 = 94.
(Parameter set #2) For each i = 1, . . . , γ
|z−1uiz| ≤ 2|z|+ |ui| = 46 and |z
−1wjz| ≤ 2|z|+ |wj | = 46
and
|∆2p| = pn(n− 1) = 132p.
Hence |∆2pz−1uiz|, |∆2pz−1wjz| ∈ [132p− 46, 132p+ 46] and
|∆2pz−1uiz| − |∆
2(p−1)z−1uiz| ≥ 132− 2 · 46 = 40
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|∆2pz−1wjz| − |∆
2(p−1)z−1wjz| ≥ 132− 2 · 46 = 40.
This observation implies that for both parameter sets the sequences {|∆2pz−1uiz|}∞p=0 and {|∆
2pz−1wjz|}∞p=0
are strictly increasing. Thus, to recover the original power of ∆ one can repeatedly multiply u′i (and w
′
j) on
the left by ∆2 until the length cannot be reduced anymore (see Algorithm 2.1). Moreover, since the difference
between two elements differing by ∆2 is at least 40 even crude approximations of the length function must
work.
Algorithm 2.1 (∆-power recovery).
Input: An element w ∈ Bn.
Output: An element u minimal in the left coset
〈
∆−2
〉
w.
Computations:
A. Set u = w.
B. If |u| > |∆−2u| then set u = ∆−2u and goto B.
C. If |u| > |∆2u| then set u = ∆2u and goto B.
D. Otherwise output u.
Clearly Algorithm 2.1 always terminates. The time complexity of the algorithm depends on the complexity
of the procedure which approximates the geodesic length. The procedure is heuristic and its worst case
complexity is not known. Experimental results in [5] suggest that the length approximation can be efficiently
computed for most braid words and we estimate the expected complexity of the procedure as O(n). Under
this assumption, it is easy to see that the power-recovery algorithm can be executed in at most O((|w| +
n2)|w|/n2) = O(|w|2/n2+ |w|) steps as the algorithm performs up to |w|/n2 iterations and on each iteration
for a word u of length up to |w| the length of a word ∆2u is estimated.
2.3. Recovering conjugator. The second part of the attack computes a secret conjugator. At this point
we assume that all ∆-powers from the system (1) are successfully found and we have a system of equations
of the form
(2)


w′′1 = zw1z
−1
. . .
w′′γ = zwγz
−1
v′′1 = zv1z
−1
. . .
v′′γ = zvγz
−1
or


z−1w′′1 z = w1
. . .
z−1w′′γz = wγ
z−1v′′1 z = v1
. . .
z−1v′′γz = vγ
where only elements u′′i = ∆
−2piu′i and w
′′
j = ∆
−2riw′j are known. Let us call two sets of braids separated if
they can be expressed as words over disjoint commuting sets of generators of Bn. As mentioned in Section
1.5 to break the protocol it is sufficient to find any conjugator z′ which conjugates two tuples of elements
(u′′1 , . . . , u
′′
γ) and (w
′′
1 , . . . , w
′′
γ ) into two separated tuples of elements (u1, . . . , uγ) and (w1, . . . , wγ). This is
the main goal of our attack.
Let u¯ = (u1, . . . , um) be a tuple of elements in Bn and x is an element of Bn. Denote by |u¯| the total
length of elements in u¯, i.e., put
|u¯| =
m∑
i=1
|ui|.
Denote by u¯x a tuple obtained from u¯ by conjugation of each its element by x. It is intuitively clear that
conjugation of a tuple of braids by a random element x almost always increases the length of the tuple. In
other words, for a random element x the inequality
(3) |u¯x| > |u¯|
is almost always true. We do not have a proof of this fact, but numerous experiments convince us that it is
true. Moreover, conjugation by longer elements almost always results in longer tuples.
The idea that conjugation consequently increases the length of tuples is not new. It was used in papers
[4], [3] for different length functions with different success. But the most successful is a recent attack [6]
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which uses approximation of the geodesic length. In this paper we use the idea of separating two tuples of
braids. To find z′ we repeatedly conjugate the tuple (u′′1 , . . . , u
′′
γ , w
′′
1 , . . . , w
′′
γ ) by generators of Bn and their
inverses and if for some generator σ±1k the decrease of the total length of the tuple is observed then it is
reasonable to guess that σ±1k is involved in z
′.
Algorithm 2.2 (Recovering conjugator - I).
Input: Tuples a¯ = {a1, . . . , aγ} and b¯ = {b1, . . . , bγ}.
Output: An element z′ separating tuples a¯ and b¯.
Initialization: Set z′ = 1.
Computations:
A. For each i = 1, . . . , n− 1 and ε = ±1 conjugate tuples a¯ and b¯ by a generator σεi and compute
δi,ε = |a¯
σεi |+ |b¯σ
ε
i | − (|a¯|+ |b¯|).
B. If for some σεi the sets a¯
σεi and b¯σ
ε
i are separated then output z′ = σεi z
′.
C. Otherwise, if all δi,ε are positive (i.e., conjugation by σ
ε
i cannot further decrease the total length)
then output FAILURE.
D. Otherwise choose i and ε for which δi,ε is minimal. Set z
′ = σεi z
′, a¯ = a¯σ
ε
i , and b¯ = b¯σ
ε
i . Goto step
A.
The described attack is similar to the one described in [6]. Recall that the main problem in [6] was the
existence of so-called peaks (see [6, Definition 2.5]). This phenomenon is a consequence of difficult structure
of finitely generated subgroups of braid groups. In this paper, we do not have this problem as z is chosen in
the whole group Bn.
Note that Algorithm 2.2 is a greedy descend procedure. It may fail due to the fact that there exists a small
fraction of words for which the inequality (3) does not hold. It is also prone to the length approximation
errors. One can significantly reduce the failure rate of a descent procedure by introducing a backtracking
algorithm which allows exploration of more than one search paths. Algorithm 2.3 gives an implementation
of the attack with backtracking.
Algorithm 2.3 (Recovering conjugator with Backtracking).
Input: Tuples a¯ = {a1, . . . , aγ} and b¯ = {b1, . . . , bγ}.
Output: An element z′ separating tuples a¯ and b¯.
Initialization: Set S = {(a¯, b¯, 1)}.
Computations:
A. If S = ∅ then output FAILURE.
B. Choose (x¯, y¯, c) ∈ S such that |x¯|+ |y¯| is the minimal.
C. For each i = 1, . . . , n− 1 and ε = ±1 conjugate tuples x¯ and y¯ by a generator σεi and compute
δi,ε = |x¯
σεi |+ |y¯σ
ε
i | − (|x¯|+ |y¯|).
D. If for some σεi the sets x¯
σεi and y¯σ
ε
i are separated then output z′ = σεi c.
E. Otherwise, for each i = 1, . . . , n− 1 and ε = ±1 add the tuple (x¯σ
ε
i , x¯σ
ε
i , σεi c) to the set S. Goto step
A.
We must mention here that, although there is a possibility that Algorithm 2.3 outputs FAILURE or does
not terminate on some inputs, this situation has never occurred in our experiments.
Finally, we present another modification of Algorithm 2.2.
Algorithm 2.4 (Recovering conjugator - II).
Input: Tuples a¯ = {a1, . . . , aγ} and b¯ = {b1, . . . , bγ}.
Output: An element z′ separating tuples a¯ and b¯.
Initialization: Set z′ = 1.
Computations:
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A. For each i = 1, . . . , n− 1 and ε = ±1 conjugate tuples a¯ and b¯ by a generator σεi and compute
δi,ε = |a¯
σεi |+ |b¯σ
ε
i | − (|a¯|+ |b¯|).
B. If all δi,ε are positive (i.e., conjugation by σ
ε
i cannot further decrease the total length) and the sets
a¯ and b¯ are separated then output z′.
C. If all δi,ε are positive (i.e., conjugation by σ
ε
i cannot further decrease the total length), but the sets
a¯ and b¯ are not separated then output FAILURE.
D. Otherwise choose i and ε for which δi,ε is minimal. Set z
′ = σεi z
′, a¯ = a¯σ
ε
i , and b¯ = b¯σ
ε
i . Goto step
A.
Algorithms 2.2 and 2.4 are almost the same except that they have different termination conditions.
Algorithm 2.2 stops as soon as the tuples are separated, while Algorithm 2.4 tries to minimize the total
length of the tuple and when the minimal value is reached it checks if the current tuples are separated.
The complexity of step A in Algorithms 2.2 and 2.4 is O(γn(|ai|+|bi|)). The maximal number of iterations
can be bounded by the total length of the input |ai|+ |bi|. A very crude upper bound on the complexity of
the two algorithms is O(γn(|ai|+ |bi|)2).
The complexity of Algorithm 2.3 is harder to estimate. Potentially, the backtracking mechanism may
cause the algorithm to explore exponentially many potential solutions. However, our experiments show that
a very few backtracking steps are required to find a solution.
2.4. Results of experiments. The attack was tested on different sets of instances of the protocol. In
particular we generated the sets BL and BR randomly and used fixed sets BL = {σ1, . . . , σl} and BR =
{σl+2, . . . , σn−1}. We used the proposed values of the parameters (see Section 1.6). In addition the attack
was tested on instances generated with the increased length of the secret conjugator z.
In all the experiments Algorithm 2.3 had 100% success of producing a separating conjugator z′. The
average time of a run of the algorithm was 4.5 seconds when executed on a Dual Core Opteron 2.2 GHz
machine with 4GB of ram. The algorithm without backtracking had slightly smaller but still respectable
success rate of 90%. It is very interesting to notice that Algorithm 2.4 actually recovered the original secret
conjugator z in about 40% of the cases. That is the reason we mention this algorithm in the paper.
Experiments with instances of TTP protocol generated using |z| = 50 (which is almost three times greater
than the suggested value) again showed 100% success rate. However, we need to point out that the attack
may fail when the length of z is large relative to the length of ∆2. For instance when in the second parameter
set the length of z is increased to 100, the algorithm recovering ∆-powers sometimes output wrong values.
Nevertheless, the success rate of Algorithm 2.3 is still about 90% in this case. We think it is possible to
modify our algorithms to work with increased parameter values. But the biggest concern here is that the
protocol with increased parameter values might be not suitable for purposes of lightweight cryptography.
References
[1] I. Anshel, M. Anshel, D. Goldfeld, An algebraic method for public-key cryptography, Math. Res. Lett. 6 (1999),
287–291.
[2] I. Anshel, M. Anshel, D. Goldfeld, S. Lemieux, ”Key Agreement, The Algebraic EraserTM , and Lightweight Cryp-
tography”. In ”Algebraic Methods in Cryptography”, Contemporary Math. 418 (2006), 1–17.
[3] D. Garber, S. Kaplan, M. Teicher, B. Tsaban, U. Vishne ”Length-based conjugacy search in the Braid group”,
available at http://arxiv.org/abs/math.GR/0209267.
[4] J. Hughes, A. Tannenbaum, ”Length-based attacks for certain group based encryption rewriting systems”. In:
Workshop SECI02 Securite` de la Communication sur Intenet, September 2002, Tunis, Tunisia.
[5] A. G. Myasnikov, V. Shpilrain, A. Ushakov. A practical attack on some braid group based cryptographic protocols.
In CRYPTO 2005, Lecture Notes Comp. Sc. 3621 (2005), 86-96.
[6] A. D. Myasnikov, A. Ushakov. Length Based Attack and Braid Groups: Cryptanalysis of Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld
Key Exchange Protocol. T. Okamoto and X. Wang (Eds.): PKC 2007, LNCS 4450, 2007, 768.
CRYPTANALYSIS OF ANSHEL-ANSHEL-GOLDFELD-LEMIEUX KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL 9
Department of Mathematics, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ 07030
E-mail address: amyasnikov@stevens.edu
Department of Mathematics, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ 07030
E-mail address: aushakov@stevens.com
